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Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation
Author(s) -
Yang Junho,
Kawamura Tetsuya,
Ogawa Kazuhito
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/meca.12089
Subject(s) - dilemma , prisoner's dilemma , microeconomics , economics , control (management) , game theory , mathematics , management , geometry
ABSTRACT We experimentally examine the effect of multimarket contact utilizing 2 × 2 Prisoner's Dilemma games and a strict discount factor control. We find that cooperation rates when participants play both games simultaneously are lower than or equal to when they play each game separately. This finding suggests that experimental multimarket contact may inhibit cooperation.