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A Generalization of the Lone Wolf Theorem
Author(s) -
İnal Hakan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
metroeconomica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.256
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-999X
pISSN - 0026-1386
DOI - 10.1111/meca.12048
Subject(s) - generalization , constructive , matching (statistics) , mathematical economics , preference , set (abstract data type) , mathematics , combinatorics , revealed preference , discrete mathematics , computer science , econometrics , statistics , mathematical analysis , process (computing) , programming language , operating system
A non‐constructive generalization of the ‘lone wolf’ theorem, which states that in the roommates problem an agent is single in a stable matching if and only if that agent is single in every other stable matching, is presented. The generalization is in two directions: (i) the set of permissible roommates is arbitrary as long as all singles are allowed, and (ii) the set of preference profiles is any subset of the set of all profiles of strict preferences defined over permissible roommates.