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The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99
Author(s) -
Akirav Osnat,
Cox Gary W.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12216
Subject(s) - discretion , monarchy , cabinet (room) , political science , constitutional monarchy , democracy , government (linguistics) , political economy , verdict , law , humanities , economics , philosophy , history , politics , linguistics , archaeology
In this article, we examine bonuses garnered by government formateurs in all European democracies that began the 20th century as constitutional monarchies. Using a new data set on how portfolios were allocated in each democratic coalition cabinet formed 1901–99, we show that formateurs’ bonuses were positive and significant when the monarch still exercised discretion in choosing them but declined after the monarch’s role was constrained. Relatedly, Gamson’s Law was more strongly violated when monarchs played a larger role. After identifying the dates at which monarchs were constrained, we conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis, comparing formateurs’ bonuses in each reformed country with those in otherwise similar countries that did not reform at the same time. The results support the hypothesis that greater royal discretion engendered larger formateurs’ bonuses.