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How Responsive Are Legislators to Policy Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment in a State Legislature
Author(s) -
Zelizer Adam
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12206
Subject(s) - legislature , voting , state (computer science) , position (finance) , political science , field (mathematics) , public administration , public economics , politics , economics , law , computer science , mathematics , algorithm , pure mathematics , finance
Theories of legislative committees, lobbying, and cue‐taking assume information affects legislators' support for policy alternatives. However, there is little direct, empirical evidence to support this foundational assumption about legislative behavior. This article reports results from a field experiment in which state legislators were randomly assigned to receive policy research about pending proposals. Results show that policy information increased aggregate cosponsorship by 60% above baseline rates. For one bill covered critically, information diminished cosponsorship and roll‐call voting support. Results are broadly consistent with information signaling models' predictions about the importance of information to position taking.