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Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll‐Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics
Author(s) -
Bertelli Anthony M.,
McCann Pamela J. Clouser
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12183
Subject(s) - legislator , decentralization , roll call , voting , politics , public administration , distributive property , administration (probate law) , state (computer science) , representation (politics) , political science , political economy , economics , law and economics , law , legislation , mathematics , algorithm , computer science , pure mathematics
Congress packages pork‐barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll‐call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home‐state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within‐legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.