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Veto Players Revisited: Internal and External Factors Influencing Policy Production
Author(s) -
West Karleen Jones,
Lee Hoon
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12043
Subject(s) - veto , cohesion (chemistry) , production (economics) , legislation , politics , collective action , economics , political economy , law and economics , political science , economic system , microeconomics , law , chemistry , organic chemistry
Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations.