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How the Party Can Win in Personal Vote Systems: The “Selectoral Connection” and Legislative Voting in L ithuania
Author(s) -
Preece Jessica Robinson
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12040
Subject(s) - voting , legislature , incentive , selection (genetic algorithm) , instant runoff voting , electoral reform , political science , connection (principal bundle) , contingent vote , law and economics , economics , disapproval voting , group voting ticket , law , microeconomics , computer science , politics , engineering , democracy , structural engineering , artificial intelligence
Electoral rules can motivate politicians to cultivate a “personal vote” through their legislative voting records. However, I argue that candidate‐selection procedures have the ability to overpower these electoral incentives. This study—the first systematic study of how candidate selection and electoral rules interact—takes advantage of L ithuania's unique mixed electoral rules and fortuitous candidate‐selection procedures. Regardless of electoral rules , MP s whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not. This evidence of a “selectoral connection” suggests candidate‐selection procedures must be studied much more seriously.