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The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior in U ruguay
Author(s) -
Chasquetti Daniel,
Micozzi Juan Pablo
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12034
Subject(s) - legislature , unitary state , legislation , personalization , politics , space (punctuation) , political science , political economy , public administration , business , economics , law , computer science , marketing , operating system
How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in U ruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.