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Measuring Partisan Bias in Single‐Member District Electoral Systems
Author(s) -
McGhee Eric
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12033
Subject(s) - gerrymandering , redistricting , measure (data warehouse) , single member district , political science , electoral system , control (management) , political economy , law and economics , economics , law , politics , general election , computer science , democracy , first past the post voting , database , management
In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single‐member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an “efficient” gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests.