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Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S . S enate
Author(s) -
Smith Steven S.,
Ostrander Ian,
Pope Christopher M.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.1111/lsq.12011
Subject(s) - scrutiny , legislature , table (database) , legislation , political science , politics , metaphor , power (physics) , law and economics , motion (physics) , law , advertising , business , economics , computer science , linguistics , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , data mining
While the metaphor of H ouse parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the S enate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the S enate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agenda control or special party influence? Using an analysis of individual S enators' behavior on thousands of votes and an assessment of interest group scores, we find that motions to table do not elicit higher party influence or provide much political cover. A desire to speed up the legislative process, rather than to insulate members from electoral scrutiny, seems to motivate the use of motions to table.