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Employers' Efforts to Deter Shirking in Teams: Evidence from Job Vacancies
Author(s) -
Brenčič Vera
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
labour
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.403
H-Index - 34
eISSN - 1467-9914
pISSN - 1121-7081
DOI - 10.1111/labr.12038
Subject(s) - business , supervisor , profit sharing , labour economics , work (physics) , for profit , public relations , economics , management , finance , political science , mechanical engineering , engineering
Abstract Employers can use profit sharing to elicit effort in teams as long as shirking is sufficiently costly. Analysis of descriptions of job vacancies from the online job board monster.com reveals that the threat of shirking does not deter employers from offering profit sharing to reward workers in teams. However, when team work is prevalent, employers are more likely to advertise a work environment where shirking is easier to detect and penalize. We do not find evidence of similar employers' efforts to deter shirking in teams if jobs entail: frequent interactions with a supervisor, volunteering, or work for a non‐profit organization.