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Emotions, personhood and social ontology: A critical realist approach
Author(s) -
Walsh Philip
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal for the theory of social behaviour
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.615
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1468-5914
pISSN - 0021-8308
DOI - 10.1111/jtsb.12276
Subject(s) - personhood , epistemology , critical realism (philosophy of perception) , perspective (graphical) , sociology , critical theory , ontology , constitution , meaning (existential) , psychology , realism , philosophy , political science , law , artificial intelligence , computer science
This paper addresses the question of the relations between emotions and personhood, with a view to advancing a critical realist account of the role of emotions in social life. It is argued that the constitution of persons has to be approached from an ontological perspective, and that this raises questions about how sociology has addressed the meaning and role of emotions. Margaret Archer's critical realist perspective on them as commentaries on human concerns is broadly endorsed, but some significant correctives are proposed, especially with respect to the important distinction between primary and secondary emotions. To this end, it is argued that the affect spectrum theory advanced by Warren TenHouten can be fruitfully appended to a critical realist theory of emotions.