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Charitable asymmetric bidders
Author(s) -
Bos Olivier
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12406
Subject(s) - vickrey–clarke–groves auction , vickrey auction , common value auction , economics , microeconomics , generalized second price auction , english auction , reverse auction , auction theory , dutch auction , revenue equivalence , complete information
Recent papers show that the all‐pay auction is better at raising money for charity than the first‐price auction with symmetric bidders under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that the all‐pay auction still raises more money than the first‐price auction. Thus, the all‐pay auction should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.