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Securely implementable social choice functions in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions
Author(s) -
Nishizaki Katsuhiko
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12282
Subject(s) - differentiable function , valuation (finance) , economics , social choice theory , microeconomics , constant (computer programming) , mathematical economics , public good , function (biology) , mathematics , computer science , pure mathematics , finance , evolutionary biology , programming language , biology
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007) in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions. In these economies, although Saijo et al. (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, 1973) are securely implementable when the valuation functions of the public good are (i) differentiable, concave, and (ii) identified with a real number, respectively, this paper shows the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant when the valuation functions of the public good are strictly increasing and strictly concave.