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Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments
Author(s) -
KELSEY DAVID,
LE ROUX SARA
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12185
Subject(s) - ambiguity , ambiguity aversion , perception , nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , economics , one shot , best response , econometrics , microeconomics , psychology , computer science , engineering , mechanical engineering , neuroscience , programming language
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best‐shot and weakest‐link models of public good provision. The models are first analyzed theoretically. Then, we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behavior in these games. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity differs between a local opponent and a foreign one. We find that an ambiguity‐safe strategy is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion influences behavior in games. Subjects tend to choose contributions above (respectively, below) the Nash equilibrium in the best‐shot (respectively, weakest‐link) model.