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Bartering Games in the Kolm Triangle
Author(s) -
ESSEN MATT VAN
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12101
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , intuition , economics , mechanism (biology) , barter , microeconomics , mechanism design , solution concept , philosophy , epistemology , macroeconomics
We study a public good mechanism that possesses several attractive properties. In particular, the mechanism always produces feasible allocations, induces a game where the Nash equilibria are all individually rational, and, in contrast to the voluntary contribution mechanism, supports the Lindahl allocation as a Nash equilibrium allocation. The geometric framework of the Kolm triangle is employed to illustrate the workings of the mechanism and provide intuition for the main results.