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Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions
Author(s) -
FIGUIÈRES CHARLES,
MASCLET DAVID,
WILLINGER MARC
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12036
Subject(s) - persistence (discontinuity) , internalism and externalism , turnover , intrinsic motivation , ideal (ethics) , social psychology , psychology , positive economics , economics , epistemology , philosophy , geotechnical engineering , management , engineering
We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is “weak.” Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic “moral ideal.” We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents leads to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of overcontributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), the “restart effect” and the observation that the decay in contributions is slower in longer games. Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation.