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Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems
Author(s) -
YENGIN DUYGU
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12031
Subject(s) - economics , microeconomics , incentive , preference , incentive compatibility , budget constraint
We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive‐compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical preferences lower bound : each agent should be at least as well off as in a hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.