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Informational and Monetary Lobbying: Expert Politicians, Good Decisions?
Author(s) -
FELGENHAUER MIKE
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/jpet.12012
Subject(s) - ex ante , decision maker , economics , cheap talk , strategic interaction , quality (philosophy) , microeconomics , public economics , macroeconomics , management science , philosophy , epistemology
Abstract This paper finds that the strategic interaction between opposing interest groups depends on the decision maker's expertise. If the costs to provide information are sufficiently low, then the decision quality is nonmonotonic in the politician's expertise. An expert may attract less informational lobbying and make worse decisions than a politician who is ex ante endowed with less information and therefore less predisposed to a particular policy.