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Self‐Control, Effort Procrastination, and Competitive Equilibrium in Insurance Markets
Author(s) -
Ai Jing,
Zhao Lin,
Zhu Wei
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/jori.12275
Subject(s) - adverse selection , procrastination , pooling , economics , welfare , microeconomics , control (management) , dynamic inconsistency , competitive equilibrium , incentive , actuarial science , market economy , psychology , management , artificial intelligence , computer science , psychotherapist
This article studies consumers’ self‐control problems in precautionary activities, their contract choices, and the welfare implications in a competitive insurance market. Present bias and consumer naivete both induce consumers to procrastinate or eventually give up precautionary efforts. In consequence, self‐control problems disrupt the monotonicity of consumers’ indifference curve on contract choices, leading to a pooling equilibrium or an absence of risk–coverage correlation, in addition to the classic result of adverse selection. Compulsory insurance raises all consumers’ welfare only in adverse selection, but not in other equilibrium patterns.