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W HAT D RIVES T ORT R EFORM L EGISLATION? A N A NALYSIS OF S TATE D ECISIONS TO R ESTRICT L IABILITY T ORTS
Author(s) -
Deng Yiling,
Zanjani George
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/jori.12186
Subject(s) - state (computer science) , liability , business , advertising , computer science , finance , algorithm
A BSTRACT This article studies the timing of state‐level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. Using discrete‐time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity—as measured by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced—to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political‐institutional factors and regional effects—such as Republican control of the state government, single‐party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state's Democrats—are also associated with quicker reform adoption.