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Insurance Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence From a Dependent Verification Program
Author(s) -
Geruso Michael,
Rosen Harvey S.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/jori.12046
Subject(s) - actuarial science , business , health insurance , affect (linguistics) , compliance (psychology) , health plan , family medicine , psychology , medicine , health care , economics , social psychology , economic growth , communication
Many employers have implemented dependent verification (DV) programs, which aim to reduce employee benefits costs by ensuring that ineligible persons are not enrolled in their health insurance plans as dependents. We evaluate a DV program using a panel of health plan enrollment data from a large, single‐site employer. We find that dependents were 2.7 percentage points less likely to be reenrolled in the year that DV was introduced, indicating that this fraction of dependents was ineligibly enrolled prior to the program's introduction. There is some evidence consistent with the notion that these dependents were actually ineligible, rather than merely discouraged from reenrollment by compliance costs. We find no indication that the removal of these ineligible dependents spilled over to affect the enrollment of eligible dependents within the same family.