After M ac I ntyre

In his influential book A fter V irtue , A lasdair M ac I ntyre identifies K ierkegaard's view of ethics with that of K ant. Both K ant and K ierkegaard, according to M ac I ntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. R onald M . G reen, in K ierkegaard and K ant: The H idden D ebt , accepts and deepens this alignment between the two thinkers. G reen argues that K ierkegaard deliberately obscured his debt to K ant by a systematic “misattribution” of his ideas to other thinkers, and to classical philosophy in particular. This essay argues that M ac I ntyre and G reen are mistaken in identifying K ierkegaard with the K antian tradition of moral autonomy and that they overlook his debt to the classical conception of virtue. In casting K ierkegaard in the role of the quintessential exponent of a modern conception of freedom, they have perhaps overlooked one of the greatest critics of moral autonomy who has ever lived.