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Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness
Author(s) -
Walker Margaret Urban
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of religious ethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.306
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1467-9795
pISSN - 0384-9694
DOI - 10.1111/jore.12026
Subject(s) - forgiveness , resentment , third party , argument (complex analysis) , psychology , law and economics , social psychology , law , political science , sociology , internet privacy , computer science , politics , biochemistry , chemistry
It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third‐party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A , who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C . Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.