Interpreting Responsibility Politically

POLITICAL theorists and philosophers typically think of agents as morally responsible for injustice when two conditions obtain: the agents’ behavior—their acts, attempts, and omissions—leads to or results in some wrongful event or condition (causation); and, that behavior is proscribed or violates moral requirements (culpability). Few people doubt that when injustice follows straightforwardly from the culpable behavior of some agent, that agent “is responsible” or should be “held responsible” for it. This conception of responsibility captures a widely held understanding (at least in the West) of commonsense morality, one that seems to connect agency to redress in the right way by linking causation and blameworthy behavior with an obligation to make amends, to put things right. Moral responsibility is only one species of responsibility: legal liability often (but not always) tracks moral responsibility (they diverge, for instance, in cases of strict liability). In addition, relationships can give rise to responsibility: I might have a special obligation to clear my neighbor’s sidewalk of snow simply because she needs the help and is close to me. Some theorists maintain that we have responsibilities to help others by virtue of our capacity to do so without giving up anything of moral significance. Further, certain social roles create responsibility: