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New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees*
Author(s) -
Chambolle Claire,
Christin Clémence
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/joie.12247
Subject(s) - spillover effect , business , product (mathematics) , competition (biology) , economic surplus , industrial organization , advertising , commerce , marketing , welfare , economics , microeconomics , market economy , ecology , geometry , mathematics , biology
The availability of a new product in a store creates an informative spillover that extends past the store itself through word‐of‐mouth advertising. Because of this spillover, each retailer is able to extract a slotting fee from the manufacturer at product introduction. Slotting fees may discourage innovation by the manufacturer and, in turn, reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. A manufacturer is more likely to pay lower slotting fees when it can advertise more heavily, or when it faces a larger buyer. These results are robust to variations in retail competition, firms’ discount factors, and the identity of the innovating firm.

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