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Vertical Exclusion with Downstream Risk Aversion or Limited Liability
Author(s) -
Hansen Stephen,
Motta Massimo
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/joie.12212
Subject(s) - upstream (networking) , downstream (manufacturing) , competition (biology) , business , risk aversion (psychology) , shock (circulatory) , liability , payment , microeconomics , ex ante , production (economics) , revenue , economic surplus , industrial organization , economics , finance , expected utility hypothesis , financial economics , market economy , medicine , computer network , ecology , macroeconomics , marketing , computer science , biology , welfare
An upstream firm with full commitment bilaterally contracts with two ex ante identical downstream firms. Each observes its own cost shock, and faces uncertainty from its competitor’s shock. When they are risk neutral and can absorb losses, the upstream firm contracts symmetric outputs for production efficiency. However, when they are risk averse, competition requires the payment of a risk premium due to revenue uncertainty. Moreover, when they enjoy limited liability, competition requires the upstream firm to share additional surplus. To resolve these trade‐offs, the upstream firm offers exclusive contracts in many cases.