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Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions
Author(s) -
Jin Ginger Zhe,
Rysman Marc
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/joie.12088
Subject(s) - competition (biology) , set (abstract data type) , perspective (graphical) , microeconomics , business , advertising , pricing strategies , economics , marketing , industrial organization , computer science , ecology , artificial intelligence , biology , programming language
We study a new data set of U . S . sports card conventions from the perspective of the pricing theory of two‐sided markets. Conventions are two‐sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two‐sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.