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POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES: MANIPULATION BY LEADERS VERSUS MANIPULATION BY RESEARCHERS? EVIDENCE FROM A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Author(s) -
Mandon Pierre,
Cazals Antoine
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of economic surveys
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.657
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1467-6419
pISSN - 0950-0804
DOI - 10.1111/joes.12263
Subject(s) - politics , order (exchange) , meta regression , meta analysis , economics , quality (philosophy) , publication bias , affect (linguistics) , selection bias , phenomenon , regression analysis , positive economics , public economics , political science , macroeconomics , psychology , finance , law , computer science , statistics , medicine , philosophy , mathematics , communication , epistemology , machine learning , physics , quantum mechanics
Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature, we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from 1037 regressions in 46 studies, our meta‐analysis suggests that little, if any, systematic evidence can be found in the research record that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. However, it is much more clear that researchers selectively report that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. The publication selection bias highlighted has nonetheless been reduced during the past 25 years of research. We also show that the incumbents' strategies differ depending on which tools they use. Finally, the nature and quality of political institutions appear to be the factors which most affect the political budget cycles.