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Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question‐New Evidence
Author(s) -
CHOI DONG BEOM,
HOLCOMB MICHAEL R.,
MORGAN DONALD P.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12742
Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , arbitrage , monetary economics , business , capital requirement , safer , constraint (computer aided design) , asset (computer security) , economics , finance , incentive , microeconomics , computer security , computer science , mathematics , geometry , machine learning
Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it took effect in 2018. Security level analysis suggests banks actively added riskier securities, rather than merely shedding safer ones. Despite the risk shifting, overall bank risk did not increase, evidently because the banks most constrained by the new leverage rule significantly increased leverage capital ratios.