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Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
Author(s) -
MILLER DAVID S.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12606
Subject(s) - independence (probability theory) , welfare , economics , politics , mechanism (biology) , political structure , monetary economics , macroeconomics , market economy , political science , philosophy , statistics , mathematics , epistemology , law
Abstract Why are monetary authorities not elected like fiscal authorities are? Advanced economies pair an elected fiscal authority with an independent monetary authority. Replicating the advanced economies' structure with authorities microfounded by a political economy model shows that this structure is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest possible welfare. Goal and instrument independence, singly and in combination, are insufficient to minimize time inconsistency, though their combination is necessary.