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Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints
Author(s) -
HOLDEN TOM D.,
LEVINE PAUL,
SWARBRICK JONATHAN M.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12601
Subject(s) - financial intermediary , equity (law) , monetary economics , intermediary , retained earnings , business , financial system , earnings , finance , economics , debt , political science , law
We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.