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How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector
Author(s) -
MISHRA PRACHI,
RESHEF ARIELL
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12578
Subject(s) - governor , deregulation , financial sector , work (physics) , financial system , construct (python library) , financial regulation , central bank , finance , economics , business , monetary economics , monetary policy , market economy , engineering , mechanical engineering , computer science , programming language , aerospace engineering
Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.