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On Freezing Depositor Funds at Financially Distressed Banks: An Experimental Analysis
Author(s) -
DAVIS DOUGLAS D.,
REILLY ROBERT J.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12324
Subject(s) - market liquidity , fragility , publicity , business , monetary economics , financial fragility , financial system , finance , economics , financial crisis , marketing , macroeconomics , chemistry
This article reports an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of alterations in the terms of repayments to depositors following a liquidity suspension, as well as the effect of alterations in the publicity of information about withdrawal behavior on the fragility of distressed banks. Results indicate that a “tough” renegotiation stance of protecting depositors who maintain their money in the bank, can quite effectively promote stability. Information provided to depositors regarding past withdrawal behavior weakens the effectiveness of a tough renegotiation policy but reduces fragility somewhat for a more lenient rescheduling condition.
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