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An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market‐Price Triggers
Author(s) -
DAVIS DOUGLAS,
KORENOK OLEG,
PRESCOTT EDWARD SIMPSON
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/jmcb.12132
Subject(s) - regulator , economics , equity (law) , monetary economics , econometrics , capital (architecture) , microeconomics , biology , history , biochemistry , archaeology , gene , political science , law
We report an experiment that evaluates three market‐based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a “fixed‐trigger” regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion; a “regulator” regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on prices; and a “prediction market” regime, where regulators also observe a market that predicts conversion. Consistent with theory, we observe inefficiencies and conversion errors in the fixed‐trigger and regulator regimes. The prediction market somewhat improves the regulator's performance, but inefficiencies and conversion errors persist. The regulator regime has conversion errors over the widest range of shocks.