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Experiments on lotteries for shrouded and bundled goods: Investigating the economics of fukubukuro
Author(s) -
Nuryakin Chaikal,
Munro Alistair
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
the japanese economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.205
H-Index - 28
eISSN - 1468-5876
pISSN - 1352-4739
DOI - 10.1111/jere.12194
Subject(s) - lottery , economics , monopoly , microeconomics , public good , institution , durable good , law , political science
Fukubukuro (or lucky bag) is a familiar institution in Japan and elsewhere in which the exact contents of a New Year sales item are hidden from the consumer before purchase. Motivated by the fukubukuro example and the lack of evidence on risk attitudes in lotteries involving goods, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which the outcomes are bundled or unbundled goods. The implied gains to a monopoly seller for marketing goods in lottery form rather than separately are only clearly positive for lotteries where there is a higher probability of obtaining the more highly valued good.

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