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Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Branding: The Implications for Market Structure
Author(s) -
Rasmusen Eric B.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/jems.12145
Subject(s) - reputation , monopoly , business , quality (philosophy) , product (mathematics) , industrial organization , market share , microeconomics , marketing , economics , social science , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , epistemology , sociology
The Klein–Leffler model explains how fear of reputation loss can induce firms to produce high‐quality experience goods. This paper shows that reputation can be leveraged across products via umbrella branding, but only by a firm with a monopoly on at least one product. Such a firm may be able to capture a market by using umbrella branding to make high quality credible at a lower price than the incumbent competitive firms. If monopolists compete for this capture, consumers are left better off than if the market remained competitive, in some cases even though the price increases.