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While We Are Waiting for the Superbug: Constitutional Asymmetry and EU Governmental Policies to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance
Author(s) -
Jensen Carsten Strøby
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/jcms.13041
Subject(s) - corporate governance , promotion (chess) , business , soft law , public economics , member states , public health , public administration , political science , economic policy , economics , european union , law , international law , politics , finance , medicine , nursing
This article analyses how constitutional asymmetry in EU health policy affects EU‐governmental initiatives to combat antimicrobial resistance (AMR). AMR has been viewed as one of the biggest threats to public health that will arise during the next two to three decades, both within the EU and globally. During the last decade the EU has taken a number of initiatives to combat AMR. The article finds that constitutional asymmetry in health policy has a major influence on how EU‐AMR policies are developed and implemented. Policies relating to promotion initiatives (like selling pharmaceuticals in the EU) are implemented through hard law types of governance (directives and regulations), while policies more directly aiming at reducing the consumption of antimicrobials are implemented through soft law initiatives (open methods of coordination).