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Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament
Author(s) -
Hurka Steffen,
Kaeding Michael,
Obholzer Lukas
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/jcms.12270
Subject(s) - parliament , resizing , shadow (psychology) , negotiation , representation (politics) , member states , political science , legislation , european integration , law , european union , economics , international trade , psychology , politics , psychotherapist
Abstract This article investigates the determinants of assignments to European Parliament negotiating teams comprising both rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. We re‐examine the argument that under‐representation of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) from new Member States on these key posts after enlargement might have been due to a 'learning phase'. We find that MEPs from newer Member States remain considerably less likely to act as rapporteurs during the second term after enlargement (2009–14). Most importantly, this trend also holds for shadow rapporteurships under the co‐decision procedure, which is when they matter most. This structural under‐representation entails important implications for European integration, most importantly that MEPs from newer Member States are less able to influence legislation. We suggest that the patterns we find could be the result of reduced willingness, a more limited skill set, or a structural disadvantage of MEPs from the accession states in the report allocation process.