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The Puzzle of Double Referendums in the European Union
Author(s) -
Atikcan Ece Özlem
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/jcms.12239
Subject(s) - referendum , treaty , political science , maastricht treaty , european union , public opinion , work (physics) , public administration , focus (optics) , law , political economy , european integration , sociology , international trade , economics , politics , mechanical engineering , physics , optics , engineering
If voters are asked to vote twice on the same issue in a single year, why might they initially reject the proposal but then vote to approve it the second time? This has happened three times in EU referendums (Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992–93 and Ireland on the Nice Treaty in 2001–02 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008–09). No work has yet compared all six of these referendum campaigns. I focus on the campaign strategies of the Yes and No sides and investigate whether campaigners act differently in the second campaigns. Based on fieldwork in Denmark and Ireland, 38 in‐depth interviews with campaigners and public opinion data, I show that the Yes campaigners learned from their mistakes and changed their campaign strategies in the second rounds. Not only did they secure guarantees from the EU to neutralize the No side's arguments; they also used more emotional campaign arguments in the second campaigns.