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Voting Procedures and Parliamentary Representation in the European Parliament
Author(s) -
Trumm Siim
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/jcms.12237
Subject(s) - parliament , voting , political science , representation (politics) , accession , straight ticket voting , ranked voting system , proportional representation , public administration , disapproval voting , salient , instant runoff voting , single member district , public relations , law , political economy , economics , european union , democracy , international economics , politics
Parliamentary representation is a fluid concept. Yet, while the behaviour of elected representatives during roll call votes has been widely analyzed, we know little about how parliamentarians act when their individual voting choices are not made public. This paper explores the relationship between voting procedures and the likelihood that Members of the European Parliament prioritize the interests of their EP party group versus the interests of their national party. Using an original survey, I find that MEPs are more likely to prioritize the interests of their national party over those of their EP party group when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to by roll call. Moreover, this voting procedure effect is particularly salient among MEPs elected from 2004/07 accession countries.