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Regional Authority, Transnational Lobbying and the Allocation of Structural Funds in the E uropean U nion
Author(s) -
Chalmers Adam William
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
jcms: journal of common market studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.54
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1468-5965
pISSN - 0021-9886
DOI - 10.1111/jcms.12038
Subject(s) - tobit model , politics , control (management) , regulatory authority , political science , political authority , subject (documents) , business , economics , public economics , public administration , law , econometrics , management , computer science , library science
The allocation of E uropean U nion ( EU ) structural funds is subject to fierce regional lobbying. This article examines the extent to which regions with greater political authority are better able to lobby for funds than their weaker counterparts. Existing research acknowledging the importance of regional authority in these processes has used inadequate indicators. This analysis, drawing on the R egional A uthority I ndex, is the first to use regional‐level data disaggregating between regional authority as self‐rule and shared‐rule. It also uses data that measure the lobbying capacity of regions' Brussels‐based lobbying offices. Controlling for a battery of competing and control variables, Tobit regression analyses of 181 regions receiving funds in the 2007–13 period suggest that regional authority expressed as shared‐rule, but not self‐rule, has a significant impact on the allocation of structural funds in the EU .