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Shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness
Author(s) -
Kim Incheol,
Pantzalis Christos,
Wang Bin
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
journal of business finance and accounting
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.282
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1468-5957
pISSN - 0306-686X
DOI - 10.1111/jbfa.12289
Subject(s) - shareholder , business , corporate governance , premise , stock price , stock (firearms) , monetary economics , industrial organization , finance , economics , series (stratigraphy) , mechanical engineering , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , engineering , biology
We show that firm‐specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination‐informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery. Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of enhanced voluntary disclosure quality.