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Value Commitment, Resolute Choice, and the Normative Foundations of Behavioural Welfare Economics
Author(s) -
DesRoches C. Tyler
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/japp.12418
Subject(s) - normative , mistake , preference , value (mathematics) , framing (construction) , positive economics , temptation , economics , rationality , revealed preference , social psychology , epistemology , psychology , microeconomics , philosophy , political science , law , mathematics , statistics , structural engineering , engineering
Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision‐making, and the framing effect, most behavioural economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values‐based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values‐based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values‐based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioural economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe‐in‐the‐cafeteria.’