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On Regretting Things I Didn't Do and Couldn't Have Done
Author(s) -
Holroyd Jules
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/japp.12246
Subject(s) - regret , set (abstract data type) , value (mathematics) , position (finance) , epistemology , sociology , social psychology , psychology , computer science , philosophy , economics , finance , machine learning , programming language
One of the lines of investigation opened up by Wallace in The View from Here concerns the notion of regret: what it is, what it is rationally constrained by, and what are the proper objects of regret. A distinctive feature of Wallace's view is that regret is an intention‐like state, which, whilst backward‐looking, is bound up with our future directed practices of value. In this commentary, I set out Wallace's claims on regret, its rational constraints, and its objects, and raise some worries about Wallace's position on each of these three issues.