Premium
Corporations and Non‐Agential Moral Responsibility
Author(s) -
Dempsey James
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of applied philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.339
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1468-5930
pISSN - 0264-3758
DOI - 10.1111/japp.12029
Subject(s) - possession (linguistics) , moral responsibility , agency (philosophy) , moral agency , sociology , core (optical fiber) , epistemology , moral disengagement , environmental ethics , law and economics , philosophy , linguistics , materials science , composite material
One of the core challenges presented by ascriptions of moral responsibility to corporations is to identify who or what is being held responsible. A significant source of controversy in attempts to answer this challenge is whether or not responsibility can fall on a ‘corporate entity’ distinct from the individuals that make it up. In this article I argue that both sides of this debate have incorrectly assumed that the possession of moral agency is a necessary condition for holding moral responsibility. I go on to argue that it is sufficient for a corporate entity to be a ‘morally significant system’, that is a non‐agential system created by moral agents, and I develop an account of such systems. I conclude by setting out the implications of this analysis for our practices of holding corporations morally responsible.