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Social cognition is not reducible to theory of mind: When children use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others
Author(s) -
Clément Fabrice,
Bernard Stéphane,
Kaufmann Laurence
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
british journal of developmental psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.062
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 2044-835X
pISSN - 0261-510X
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-835x.2010.02019.x
Subject(s) - theory of mind , psychology , mentalization , deontic logic , false belief , task (project management) , social cognition , cognition , cognitive psychology , developmental psychology , social psychology , epistemology , philosophy , management , neuroscience , economics
The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deontic reasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point to the existence of such non‐mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviour of others. In Study 1, young children (3‐ and 4‐year‐olds) were told different versions of classic false‐belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a rule or a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, the performance of 3‐year‐olds, who fail traditional false‐belief tasks, significantly improved. In Study 2, 3‐year‐olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and to use it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified version of the false‐belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the social cognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involve mind reading.