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Understanding of verbal representation in children with autism: The case of referential opacity
Author(s) -
Mitchell Peter,
Isaacs Josephine E.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
british journal of developmental psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.062
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 2044-835X
pISSN - 0261-510X
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-835x.1994.tb00646.x
Subject(s) - autism , psychology , developmental psychology , misrepresentation , grasp , nonverbal communication , competence (human resources) , cognitive psychology , theory of mind , cognition , social psychology , political science , law , neuroscience , computer science , programming language
In two investigations, children with autism were assessed on their ability to grasp the concept of opacity; they were compared with clinically normal children aged 3–5 years. In the first investigation, children performed on a message‐desire discrepant task, in which it is necessary to take into consideration a speaker's false belief in order to interpret her message correctly. Like normal 3‐year‐olds, but unlike older children, children with autism failed at this and instead inappropriately interpreted the message literally. In the second investigation, children with autism performed on a deceptive box task, in which they judged what they had said was in the box first of all. Contrary to previous findings, they frequently committed realist errors like normal 3‐year‐olds, but unlike 4‐year‐olds. However, they were able to acknowledge their initial verbal misrepresentation when prompted, implying a fledgling grasp of opacity. Three‐year‐olds' correct judgements were similarly facilitated. It was concluded that children with autism have a broad difficulty with opacity, though some underlying competence can be accessed with prompting.