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When 3‐year‐olds understand ignorance, false belief and representational change
Author(s) -
Sullivan Kate,
Winner Ellen
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
british journal of developmental psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.062
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 2044-835X
pISSN - 0261-510X
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-835x.1991.tb00868.x
Subject(s) - false belief , psychology , ignorance , context (archaeology) , cognitive psychology , developmental psychology , theory of mind , task (project management) , social psychology , cognition , epistemology , paleontology , philosophy , biology , management , economics , neuroscience
This study examined conditions under which 3‐year‐olds can conceptualize ignorance, false belief, and representational change, and assessed the order of emergence of these three abilities. One hundred and twenty children between 2:11 and 4:1 were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: standard, explanation, and trick. In the standard condition, children were administered a standard false belief task. In both experimental conditions, the discrepancy between children's false expectation and reality was highlighted. In the explanation condition, children were also given an explanation of the source of a false belief. In the trick condition, the questions were placed in the context of a deceptive game. None of the experimental manipulations affected the younger subjects (2:11‐3:7). However, for the older subjects (3:8‐4:1), performance on the ignorance question was significantly elevated by both the highlight alone and a combination of the highlight with either explanation or trick; performance on the false belief question was significantly elevated by the highlight alone; and performance on the representational change question was significantly elevated by a combination of the highlight plus explanation. Thus, only children over 3:7 can be helped to pass the standard ignorance and false belief questions. Finally, contrary to previous findings, all three kinds of understandings emerged simultaneously, suggesting that all require a similar level of representational ability.