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The weak Borda effect is of little relevance to social choice theory
Author(s) -
Gillett Raphael
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
british journal of mathematical and statistical psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.157
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 2044-8317
pISSN - 0007-1102
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8317.1986.tb00847.x
Subject(s) - axiom , social choice theory , dominance (genetics) , relevance (law) , mathematical economics , economics , mathematics , condorcet method , econometrics , voting , biochemistry , chemistry , geometry , politics , political science , law , gene
Colman (1984) has proposed a new justification for studying the weak Borda effect. He argues that it represents the violation by the plurality procedure of the weak dominance axiom. Weak dominance is a condition which some social choice theorists consider that a fair and reasonable collective choice procedure should satisfy. However, there are fundamental difficulties associated with this new position. The criterion defined by Colman as underlying the weak Borda effect differs considerably from the weak dominance axiom. It is also inconsistent with the definition of the weak Borda effect itself. Moreover, it can be argued that the criterion underlying the weak Borda effect is in fact an unreasonably severe standard. It confounds an undesirable requirement (that only tied winners should be permitted when there is a cyclical majority) with a desirable requirement (the Condorcet criterion). Thus, only social choice procedures with a tendency to produce indecisive outcomes can satisfy the criterion. Other problems with the approach are pointed out. It is concluded that the weak Borda effect is of little relevance to social choice theory.